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BOOK REVIEWS 
New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion, by George N. Schlesinger. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988. Pp. 196. Cloth $34.50. 
Reviewed by LINDA ZAGZEBSKI, Loyola Marymount University. 
George Schlesinger's new book is full of appealing ideas in spite of its 
unappealing title. It addresses a large collection of issues in religious philos-
ophy-some old, some new, some connected, most not. The chapters on 
miracles and the Design Argument make heavy use of the calculus of prob-
ability, thus accounting for the "new perspectives" which the book promises. 
At the same time the issues are important traditional ones, though occasion-
ally with a novel twist, as we shall see. 
Chapter One races through a long list of divine attributes with special 
attention to puzzles about their consistency. Those readers familiar with the 
recent literature on the attributes will probably find the discussion much less 
thorough than would be desired. It was not clear to me why Schlesinger 
picked out the views of certain people for critical scrutiny and left out others 
which I would have thought were more important. For example, he devotes 
five pages to a very bad argument of Nicholas Rescher, only to conclude that 
the argument is very bad (pp. 36-41). 
The main insight of this chapter is an interesting view on the unity of the 
attributes. True to the spirit of the Anselmian concept of God, Schlesinger 
claims that every divine attribute is included in the concept of perfection. 
However, God's perfection does not include the possession of each great-
making property to the highest possible degree since the maximization of 
some of these properties is incompatible with the maximization of others. 
Instead, perfection should be understood as superexcellence, defined as "the 
possession of each enhancing attribute to the precise degree required so that 
in combination they contribute to the maximum sum total of magnificence" 
(p. 1). So to say that God is omnipotent or omniscient is not to say that no 
conceivable being has more power or knowledge, but that any such being 
would be inferior to God since its extra power or knowledge would be ac-
quired at the price of "giving up some more desirable quality" (p. 1). 
Schlesinger uses this view of the attributes to answer what he calls the 
"Many-gods objection" to Pascal's Wager in Chapter Six (pp. 155-56) and to 
the Design Argument of Chapter Five (p. 135). In Chapter One he is mainly 
interested in using it to resolve a series of conceptual puzzles. To name three: 
(1) The stone paradox and related paradoxes can be solved as long as 
Schlesinger is right that any being who can create a stone he cannot lift is 
252 
BOOK REVIEWS 253 
inferior to a being who cannot create such a stone but can lift anything 
whatever. 
(2) God's immutability means nothing more than the degree of constancy 
needed for excellence. If the excellence of God with respect to knowledge 
requires change, God changes. In other words, God is not immutable in the 
ordinary sense. 
(3) The alleged conflict between God's omnipotence and his inability to 
sin (impeccability) is solved as long as the ability to sin would make God 
inferior. "To reduce God's impeccability by any amount in order to make Him 
more powerful would result in less Divine excellence; on the contrary, having 
Him absolutely impeccable even at the cost of reducing His power results in 
maximum excellence" (p. 26). Impeccability, then, is one of the few, if not 
the only commonly-discussed attribute which emerges unweakened by the 
Schlesinger move. No possible being has more goodness than God. 
Let us look more closely at Schlesinger's concept of superexcellence, or 
what he sometimes calls "supereminence." By the definition quoted above, 
the precise degree of each divine attribute is included in or entailed by 
superexcellence so that in toto they constitute maximum magnificence. How-
ever, I see no reason to think superexcellence is determinate with respect to 
each of the divine attributes. I can think of three possible cases in which the 
possession of an attribute would be indeterminate: (1) when two attributes 
are indifferent with respect to greatness, (2) when two great-making attributes 
are equal with respect to greatness, and (3) when two great-making attributes 
are incommensurable. Schlesinger considers the first and third possibilities 
himself, but rejects them for what seem to me to be inadequate reasons. 
Chapter Two on the problem of evil is devoted to an elaboration of 
Schlesinger's previously-published solution and answers to objections and 
queries. The main thrust of his move is to define what he calls Degree of 
Desirability of State (DDS) as "a two-valued function depending both on the 
potentials of the individual and the extent to which his needs are being taken 
care of' (p. 54). An unsatisfied pig has a lower DDS than a satisfied pig, who 
has a lower DDS than an unsatisfied Socrates, who in turn has a lower DDS 
than a satisfied Socrates, who has a lower DDS than a dissatisfied super-Soc-
rates, and so on. There is no highest DDS, and so it is logically impossible 
for an omnipotent being to bring about such a state. "No matter by how much 
the DDS of an individual is increased, it would be precisely as short of being 
of maximum height as it is now" (p. 61). There is, therefore, no point in 
complaining that we are not higher on the scale. 
It seems to me that Schlesinger is right that there are two values of measure 
in desirability of state, but I would think that they function on two distinct 
scales of evaluation, only one of which has no upper limit. For whatever kind 
of created being you choose, it is true that it is possible that there is a being 
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higher in potential, but it is not true that for any degree of satisfaction 
you feel, there is a higher one. The concept of fully satisfied pig or fully 
satisfied Socrates is perfectly coherent. Further, we all get very much more 
upset by not having our desires satisfied and our actual potential realized 
than by not having the desires and potential of a higher being. It seems, 
then, that though we cannot expect an omnipotent and benevolent being 
to maximize our DDS on the scale of potential, he could still maximize it 
on the scale of satisfaction. 
To my mind the most interesting chapter in the book is Chapter Seven on 
divine justice. Here Schlesinger raises some very interesting and neglected 
questions on what we might call religious luck. What determines the religious 
worth of a person? Different individuals have different opportunities to avail 
themselves of good reasons to believe in God, both in the form of evidence 
for theism and in the form of a religious upbringing. Yet, Schlesinger argues, 
those who do not believe in theism irretrievably lose something of supreme 
value. But their loss is at least partly a matter of bad luck. Is this compatible 
with the justice of God? 
Schlesinger's short answer to the question "What happens to the sincere 
skeptic?" is that there is no such person. It would be an intolerable violation 
of divine justice if there were. "Consequently, those who are mature enough 
to have become aware to some extent of the splendour of nature and the 
nobility of faith, and yet refuse to embrace theism, must be people who find 
religious discipline unendurable and will therefore do everything to render 
their conscious minds oblivious to the basis of such discipline" (p. 173). This 
is a severe view and readers will no doubt want to take it up in future 
discussion. 
New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion contains a number of new argu-
ments which deserve attention in the literature. I have mentioned the ones I 
found most interesting, but philosophers who enjoy applying probability the-
ory to the topics of miracles and the Design Argument should not miss 
Chapters Four and Five. The section on assigning prior probabilities in meta-
physics (pp. 141-46) is particularly noteworthy. In addition, Chapter Three 
includes an interesting discussion comparing the different ways religious and 
secular morality treat the value of human life. 
Revelation in Religious Belief, by George I. Mavrodes. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988. Pp. vii and 161. $24.95 (cloth). 
Reviewed by WILLIAM J. ABRAHAM, Perkins School of Theology, South-
ern Methodist University. 
Good books on divine revelation are few and far between. This short, tightly 
argued work is a welcome exception. It is a model of succinct analytical work 
